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Education’s ancient and profoundly important pursuit to ‘know thyself’, is often realised through
engaging with the question ‘who am I?’ In order to the identify who in this search, it is argued in this
paper that personal identity should be understood to be embedded in the purposes one has for one’s
life through how one relates, and is therefore spiritual. This spiritual quality of personal identity is
therefore existential in character – not essential.
However, often when children respond to this question ‘who am I?’, they rely upon socially
constructed categories and labels such as religious, feminine, cool, punk and the like. The applica-
tion of such labelling assumes that meaningfulness lies in their essence; that is, they identify what is.
This can become most problematic when individuals accept and apply such essentialist labelling to
themselves, because such a process can only answer ‘what am I?’ and not the educationally more
important question of ‘who am I?’ This paper therefore challenges the inadequacy of such an
approach and offers a conceptualisation of personal identity which is spiritually embedded in a
purpose for one’s life.
Keywords: Authenticity; Existential; Heidegger; Identity; Kierkegaard
Introduction
In response to being asked, ‘who am I?’, one may answer along the lines of ‘my name
is Scott and I am an Australian male, a bit taller than average and of slim build, who
is a husband and father and I work as a university lecturer’. However, descriptors such
as these only provide indications of what one is rather than who one is. Austin (2002,
p. 5) refers to such a response as being one of ‘identification’ rather than of ‘identity’,
and argues that ‘Our names, ages, perhaps addresses reflect some aspects of who we
are, but are not who we are’, because they are only ‘superficial markers’. For example,
many youths, in order to publicly display their personal identities, often dress to
*Faculty of Education, Monash University, Churchill, Vic 3842, Australia. Email: scott.web-
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imitate the images of their popular others and readily apply labels to themselves as
being punk, cool, hip and so on. However, at best these practices only provide super-
ficial identifications, which may or may not indicate what personal identities might be.
These superficial markers of identification (not identity) have their meaningfulness
constructed from culturally agreed norms. As signifiers, Austin (2002, p. 9) claims
that they can be applied equally to ourselves and to others, and argues that ‘The
conferring process, the process of conferring on others identity labels or locations, is
the other half of the assumptive process: as we claim for ourself, we bestow on others’.
When individuals accept and apply labels and descriptive categories to themselves,
they assume that their personal identities clearly correspond to the meanings that
these terms presumably hold. This is an extreme view of the linguistic turn where
language is assumed to be the only representative medium of the nature of things,
determining what and how we should think through essentialising meanings. This
view assumes meanings are to be found in the essence of the linguistic labels them-
selves and therefore one’s personal identity can only be understood through them.
Personal identities are not formed by individuals alone but are socially constructed by
others because they (the social group) are the ones who formulate the categories and
discourses.
However, when negative labels such as ‘fatty’, ‘shortie’ and ‘loser’ are applied to
children in order to let them know the personal identity that is intended to be
enforced upon them these can be potentially harmful. Such labels can often be
applied in jest and are often cruelly attached to individuals who are not readily
accepted to be a part of the social group. Indeed such practices which signify identi-
fication are understood as being manifested in a genocidal mind. According to Tanay
(2003, p. 25), ‘the essence of a genocidal killing is the identity of the victim, not his
behaviour. He has to be killed because he is the “Other”. His identity dehumanizes
him by definition’.
It is argued here that personal identities should not be pursued in such a labelling
system, but instead should be understood as being fundamentally spiritual in charac-
ter. As such this includes what Victor Frankl (1984) referred to as ‘spiritual freedom’,
which is a freedom to choose how we relate to our existence rather than defining what
our existence is through a system of labels and categories. This perspective of personal
identity as being spiritual is a very emancipatory one and is contrasted with an essen-
tialist perspective of identity.
Personal identity is not to be found in essence
Before offering an alternative perspective which is both spiritual and existential, the
difficulties of identity formation through essentialism need to be demonstrated. From
an essentialist perspective, meanings are determined by, and thus correspond to, the
essential properties of substances. Therefore, individuals must become passive recip-
ients of ‘objective’ knowledge, where ‘objective’ here is understood to be the world as
revealed by language and discourse rather than (subjective) existence. Identity,
including personal identity, is something that can be defined by the use of labels and
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categories because the terminologies which represent them are assumed to carry the
essential meanings of the objects referenced. Thus through Essentialism, ‘other-
defined’ personal identities can be attempted to be imposed upon individual existing
children (Gutek, 2004, p. 270). As such, because meaningfulness lies in essence,
these categories can be used to label what is. For example Scott is a lecturer, or Scott
is a loser.
Heidegger (1969) argued however, that this word ‘is’ really only signifies sameness
and not identity. He demonstrates that the formulation A is A, which is the principle
of identity, means that A is the same with itself, where emphasis is upon the relation
‘with’ what is in connection. He argued that with reference to humankind’s relation
to Being, existing individuals are in this relation. The implication of this relational
aspect is profound for personal identity. Rather than identity being the correspon-
dence between the entities of the person and the category or label (such as lecturer,
loser and husband), identity is to be found in the relation between the two – how the
subjective self relates to the object. The ‘objective’ what in the question ‘what am I?’
only indicates the categorical characteristic of ‘identification’, while the more ‘subjec-
tive’ who in the question ‘who am I?’ is the relational aspect of subject to object, and
is considered in this paper to be more appropriate for a spiritual and existential
understanding of personal identity.
Søren Kierkegaard was a passionate Christian and one of the founding philoso-
phers of modern Existentialism. He went to great length to explain the difference
between the ‘objective’ what and a more ‘subjective’ how of relating, where the who of
personal identity was to be found. Kierkegaard was opposed to the notion of religion
becoming essentialised through a universal systematisation such as was argued by
Hegel. He challenged Hegel’s notion of an ‘objective’ world spirit which determined
the meaning of mankind’s existence and in doing so has became a champion for the
existing individual self.
Kierkegaard wrote through many pseudonymous authors, and through one of these
– Johannes Climacus – he discussed a man who was concerned about himself with
regards to being a Christian. Climacus suggested that if he shared this angst with his
wife and if she were to represent the objectivist spirit of Hegel’s universal system, she
would probably respond by exclaiming: 
Hubby, darling, where did you ever pick up such a notion? How can you not be a Christian?
You are Danish, aren’t you? Doesn’t the geography book say that the predominant religion
in Denmark is Lutheran-Christian? You aren’t a Jew, are you, or a Mohammedan? What
else would you be, then? (Kierkegaard, 1992, p. 50)
Through this response, Climacus indicated that to belong to a particular religion is a
‘given’, or according to Heidegger, part of our facticity, in as much as our nationality
into which we already have a presence. Personal identity through such an objectifying
system is often imposed upon us by the social categories that are understood to have
a direct correspondence to reality.
Climacus lamented that society had become as objective as this wife of a civil
servant, who reasons from a given universal whole belonging to a system, down to the
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particular individual. ‘Knowing’ is restricted to ‘speculative thought’ which is so
objective and abstracted from the particular, that there is no place for the speculative
thinker as an existing individual. Climacus criticised such a perspective as dehuman-
ising and also failing to appreciate what being religious should entail. He argued that
one’s identity was to be understood in how one related to the entities that one was
related to, and could not be determined by them.
An example of this is given in Victor Frankl’s account of being a prisoner in a Nazi
concentration camp. He argued that the category of ‘prisoner’ could not define or
determine the identity of any individual prisoner. Each person, while a prisoner in the
most trying of circumstances, still had the freedom to choose his attitude towards his
situation and to choose his way. Having experienced this very situation himself,
Frankl (1984, p. 87) concluded, ‘in the final analysis it becomes clear that the sort of
person the prisoner became was the result of an inner decision, and not the result of
camp influences alone’. He claimed that, ‘Man does not simply exist but always
decides what his existence will be, what he will become in the next moment’ (1984,
p. 154) and stated elsewhere that one’s personal identity is only possible through
relating to one’s purpose for life in a responsible manner (Frankl, 2000, p. 84). He
argued that this inner decision is made possible through a spiritual freedom that gives
meaning and purpose to one’s life. This freedom can be used to choose one’s attitude
and purpose – and therefore one’s identity – in the face of any circumstance.
Personal identity as spiritual and subjective
Kierkegaard also claimed that the individual self is spirit and a freedom somewhat
similarly to Frankl, where this freedom could be exercised to determine how one
related to oneself and one’s environment, no matter what the ‘objective’ circum-
stances may be. For Kierkegaard, personal identity is a task or a process and not a
predetermined condition defined by others. Heidegger’s notion of individuals as rela-
tions is most likely founded upon Kierkegaard’s description of the human individual
as spirit. He argued that: 
The human being is spirit. But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. But what is the self? The
self is a relation which relates to itself, or that in the relation which is its relating to itself.
The self is not the relation but the relation’s relating to itself. (Kierkegaard, 1989, p. 43)
Kierkegaard’s works, which recognise an assumed separation of the knower from the
‘objective’ knowledge of the known according to Hegelianism, were written over 150
years ago. More recently, Deborah Britzman (2003) argues that knowledge has now
become so objective that it is fragmented from experience, and that experience also
is fragmented from the person of the knower. Consequently she claims that as indi-
viduals, ‘we have come to expect personal exclusion’ from knowledge which results
in the diminishing of ‘our capacity to participate in the shaping of experience’ (Britz-
man, 2003, p. 51). While the focus of her research is upon student teachers, the issues
she describes are considered here to be equally applicable to the issues of personal
identity children generally experience. She reports that student teachers become sites
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of struggle as they experience personal identity crises when they confront attempts to
conform to their ideal identity of the ‘good teacher’ because such an ideal usually
excludes themselves as having their own personal identity distinct from this.
Responding to this struggle, Britzman draws attention to the subjective process that
these people engage with in order to make sense of and give meaning to their experi-
ences. Her conception of subjectivity is embedded in the notion that individuals are
meaning bestowing agents. She argues that: 
Subjectivity is both our conceptual orderings of things and the deep investments
summoned by such orderings. It organizes an individual’s ideas about what it means to
recognize oneself as a person, a student, a teacher, and so forth, and arranges strategies for
the realization of these multiple identities. A concern with subjectivity, or how we come to
be subjects, can move us beyond essentialist notions of human nature. (Britzman, 2003,
p. 71)
Opposing any essentialist and often rational systemisation of knowledge by appealing
to the subjectivity of the individual has been fraught with criticisms, usually with accu-
sations of relativism and solipsism. John Dewey (1958, p. 422) noted that the antag-
onists of subjectivity often relegated desires, beliefs and values to the individual
subject, but assigned ‘to knowledge alone valid reference to existence’. He claimed
that a perspective which assumes that knowledge of physical facts is representative of
their inherent meaning is usually thrust upon passive recipients, and he contrasted this
with the active thought which is necessary in order for an individual to properly under-
stand (Dewey, 1991, p. 124; 1985, pp. 150–151). Experiences are not meaningful for
persons who simply have them, but gain meaning from persons engaging with them,
and making choices as to how the elements of the experience are to be meaningful.
For an experience to be meaningful there needs to be an active component of thought
and judgement based upon the subjectivity of the individual.
The subjective individual as maker of personal identity
Personal identity is gained by how an individual relates to and values his or her rela-
tions. It is not made through objective or abstract categories that relate to the ‘what’
of one’s being (for example gender, age, rationality, career, sibling status etc.).
Charles Taylor (1985, p. 34), somewhat similarly to Austin’s differentiation between
identification and identity, argues that personal identity cannot be provided ‘by any
list of properties of other ranges, about my physical description, provenance, back-
ground, capacities, and so on’. While these may offer some reference or identification,
they cannot define someone’s personal identity. This can only be found in the way
that the individual relates to the relations one has with other entities and gives these
certain value and importance.
This does not indicate that the meanings made are totally private and exclusive of
the social environment. Taylor recognises that self-identity involves some reference
to a defining community from which frameworks are gained. The notion of making
or creating one’s identity does not imply that this can be achieved outside the
constraints of these cultural frameworks. These frameworks provide the necessary
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background for moral judgements, intuitions and relations. He argues that these
frameworks are impossible for the individual to do without (Taylor, 1989, pp. 26–27).
Frameworks provide a sense of meaning in which ‘we make sense of our lives spiritu-
ally’. He employs the term ‘spiritual’ in this context to represent a ‘strong evaluation’.
That is, the dimension by which one provides the criteria for what one regards as good
and bad, which is the basis for moral judgements and intentions.
These evaluations define one’s sense of self-identity because they form the hori-
zon from which individuals reflect and evaluate. Taylor (1985, p. 25) describes
them further as ‘strong’ or ‘deep’, because the individual who is a strong evaluator
‘goes deeper’ and ‘characterizes his motivation at greater depth’. A strong evalua-
tion generally refers to the quality of motivations, and can be differentiated from
‘weak evaluations’ that focus only on outcomes (Taylor, 1985, p. 16). Strong eval-
uations contribute to one’s spirituality because they are chosen and made valuable
by the individual on the basis of what she or he considers to be worthwhile. They
identify the reasons why one does (acting, judging, etc.) what one does, and
appear to be what Nietzsche (1989) challenges his readers to disclose as they go
beyond good and evil, to articulate the basis by which good and evil are to be
defined. These reasons reveal both what is of importance and the criteria by which
they are valued. However, Taylor warns that sometimes this can involve self-
deluding interpretations in order to preserve current desires, so it is argued that
these strong evaluations are more effectively formed when they actively engage
with the reasons that support the strong evaluations of other individuals (Hedman,
1984, pp. 358–359).
Understanding self-identity in this way can explain why, when one claims to be a
different person from what one was previously, one is not referring to the metaphys-
ical being of the continuity of the person, but instead to a decision to differentiate the
emphasis on certain ethical and spiritual traits used to ground one’s evaluations and
intentions (Morgan, 1996, pp. 242–243). Becoming a different person involves a
developing spirituality which, being of a dynamic nature involving the freedom to
make decisions, may change as particular meanings are understood to have different
relevance for the experiences of the existing individual. This accords well with the
contemporary acknowledgement that the individual, within a cultural context, has an
active role in crafting and unfolding personal identity. This takes place in a ‘circular’
type of dialogue between one’s personal identity and one’s social identity, where
neither is mutually exclusive of the other (Archer, 2000, p. 288).
Self-identity consists of both received frameworks and the individual’s stance on
moral and spiritual matters – one’s strong evaluation. Therefore, from an existential
perspective of spirituality, there is an attempt to examine these meanings of life and
one’s self-identity that already exist within the horizons of individuals. The stance
that one has from one’s horizon is often concealed (Heidegger, 1996, p. 31), and needs
to become a phenomenon – an ‘unconcealment’ – for the self to be consciously aware.
Therefore, making meaning and sense of one’s self-identity, involves one being able
to articulate (Taylor, 1985, p. 26) what one stands for, and why one values one’s
position. This articulation is one important aspect of becoming authentic, which is
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argued here to be necessary if the personal identity of children is to avoid being essen-
tialised and become spiritually based.
Personal identity becoming authentic
Existential spirituality can be either inauthentic or authentic. Individuals who have
inauthentic spirituality understand themselves and the purpose of life in general
through public frameworks only. They have not necessarily had to make a personal
commitment to them but accept them as having authoritative explanations for their
being. These public frameworks and understandings may suggest objectivity and
abstraction, and appeal to the general principles of a world-view that attempt to give
unity to all. Kierkegaard called the individual away from accepting such assumptions
(from an inauthentic spirituality) and argued that: 
The dubiousness of abstraction manifests itself precisely in connection with all existential
questions, from which abstraction removes the difficulty by omitting it and then boasts of
having explained everything. It explains immortality in general … But abstraction does not
care about whether a particular existing human being is immortal, and just that is the diffi-
culty. It is disinterested, but the difficulty of existence is the existing person’s interest, and
the existing person is infinitely interested in existing. (Kierkegaard, 1992, p. 302)
Authentic spirituality is based on freedom of choice, and involves one’s coming to
understand how meanings and frameworks are to count for one’s own situation, and
then to take ownership of this. The attempt to form a unified sense of meaning and
purpose for one’s life in this universe, the ‘connectedness of life’ (Heidegger, 1996,
p. 356), is authenticity.
According to the existentialists, being authentic allows one to determine how things
are to count towards one’s situation and how one is to act in relation to them. Gener-
ally they consider authentic individuals to take responsibility for determining and
choosing possibilities and not to simply become a determined product of a cultural
moment. Heidegger stated that the ‘existentia’ have priority over the ‘essentia’, and this
view has been made popular through the works of Sartre (1948, p. 28), especially his
claim that ‘existence precedes essence’ although it appears that Heidegger did not
always agree with Sartre’s interpretations. Heidegger argued that: 
… the existent Dasein [i.e. the existing person – or being – present in situation] can choose
itself on purpose and determine its existence primarily and chiefly starting from that choice;
that is, it can exist authentically. However, it can also let itself be determined in its being
by others and thus exist inauthentically by existing primarily in forgetfulness of its own self.
(Heidegger, 1988, p. 170)
The concepts of authenticity and inauthenticity are built upon the works of Kierkegaard
(1987, p. 259) that state when becoming authentic, ‘the individual has known himself
and has chosen himself’. This is necessary to prevent one simply ‘losing’ oneself, which
is so much easier to let happen than to becoming authentic. Kierkegaard warned: 
The biggest danger, that of losing oneself, can pass off in the world as quietly as if it were
nothing; every other loss, an arm, a leg, a wife, etc. is bound to be noticed … such a person
[who sees himself surrounded by the multitude] forgets himself, in a divine sense forgets
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his name, dares not believe in himself, finds being himself too risky, finds it much easier
and safer to be like the others, to become a copy, a number, along with the crowd.
(Kierkegaard, 1989, pp. 62–64)
Kierkegaard’s writings call the individual back out of the crowd to live an authentic
existence. By living authentically, one can choose one’s own personal identity and possi-
bilities rather than have these dictated by the ‘others’ of the crowd. For Kierkegaard,
this was where one’s meaning of life is to be found.
Like the ‘crowd’ for Kierkegaard, Heidegger referred to the ‘others’ and the ‘they’
as the cultural mass to which no particular individual can be identified. If one is
subservient to these others, dependent upon them for a sense of personal identity, one
could then only have an identity that could be defined in terms of difference. That is,
they either passively accept the ‘given’ status quo by adopting sameness or they rebel
by being different. Usually any sort of difference will suffice but these often lack
responsible purposes that have their identity without needing to reference the norm.
Therefore expressions of identity tend to be negative deconstructions rather than
more positive reconstructions.
This potential superficiality can be recognised in many contemporary youth
cultures that emphasise being different, rather than making a particular stance for
which one becomes responsible. Heidegger argued that this form of identity forma-
tion could facilitate an inauthentic existence because it is an average everydayness in
which the decisions of the they take ‘the responsibility of Dasein away from it’
(Heidegger, 1996, p. 119). Authentic existence is ‘an “ecstatic” relation of the
essence of man to the truth of Being’ (Heidegger, 1993, p. 236), requiring each
person to distinguish oneself in an independently valuable way. This is achieved by
establishing a personal stance for the possibility of one’s future and accepting respon-
sibility for it.
But many people may not be consciously aware of inauthentic intentions based on
public understandings of meaning, and therefore they often adopt an essentialist
perspective towards giving their lives purpose and identity. It is argued here that this
is something that needs to be addressed through educational endeavours if our
children are to have spiritually based personal identities. Children should be brought
to engage consciously with the questions ‘who am I?’, and ‘what is the meaning of my
being?’ in order to assist with the formation of their personal identities. They should
become aware that they are free to choose a way of being from among certain possi-
bilities, no matter what their situation. These possibilities, however, are not limitless
imaginations but are contingent upon context. The circumstances and the names that
they may be called need not necessarily determine their identities and way of being.
They can lead an increasingly authentic existence through the exercising of their
personal freedom.
Spiritually authentic identities in an unauthentic world
It is not until the socially constructed categories and labels which are imposed
upon us as givens are revealed through an aroused awareness that they are then
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able to be examined for personal significance. This awareness to choose how one
relates to these cultural norms is often referred to as authenticity. However, as
Heidegger argued, there is no ultimate authenticity because individuals are unable
to understand every meaning totally outside public discourse. Therefore, even if a
spiritual development has increasing authenticity, it nevertheless always has some
inauthenticity involved.
People operate inauthentically for the most part in ‘everyday averageness’, where
the individual can become ‘lost’ in the crowd. However, through a realisation
(generally brought on by a crisis) that the taken-for-granted meanings by which one
lives are really the meanings of others and do not necessarily have relevance for
one’s own existence, authenticity can be gained by making meanings become
personal. A Nietzschean re-evaluation of society’s values does not imply discarding
them. It can simply describe the process of making such values belong to the person
where a commitment to them is made by the individual. Authenticity does,
however, make opportunity for the individual to no longer be passively accepting of
the values and meanings of society and to adopt quite different but personally more
meaningful values and meanings. From the conservative perspective of the they, this
can be interpreted as presenting a threat to the social norm. This is why authenticity
can be somewhat ‘risky’ for the individual and can evoke feelings of dread and
angst.
Through becoming authentic, the spiritually educated person recognises his or her
personal freedom, meaning-making ability and responsibility. What makes one’s life
meaningful and purposeful is not accepted as a given, but is chosen or made to be one’s
own. Even if one adopts an institutional framework, such as a religion, to give sense
to life, the framework is not inauthentically accepted to be an authority in one’s life
simply because of one’s facticity within a particular community, but rather, because
one actively chooses it to be one’s own. Through authenticity, there is personal owner-
ship for one’s spirituality.
Existential spirituality is to be understood as involving the whole person, the values,
beliefs, understandings, emotions, motivations and actions. One should be able to live
one’s commitments. All of these aspects impinge upon how one understands one’s
personal identity and makes sense of everything one thinks, feels and does. Such an
approach to making sense of one’s existence is argued here to be valuably facilitated
through an engagement with existential questioning. This is supported by Noddings
(1993, p. 8) who argues that such ‘existential questions should form the organizing
backbone of the curriculum’. In arguing for the centrality that these questions should
have for the educative development of persons, she accentuates the importance of
these questions by claiming that ‘When we tear education from the existential roots
of life – discussing evil only in Moby Dick, God only in a survey of world religion,
creation only in brief mention of a Big Bang, love only in Romeo and Juliet – we are
part of a death orientation’ (1993, p. 13). This death orientation is claimed by
Noddings to be embedded in traditional education and involves the spirit of the
adolescent becoming docile and passive as a response to the second-hand thinking
that Dewey so often warned against.
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Conclusion
It has been argued in this paper that personal identity cannot be authentically formed
through the assigning of labels and categories even although it is often assumed that
identities can be established in this way. ‘True’ meanings are not to be found in the
essences of terms. To assume that language can represent the nature of things; that
the meanings of words can reveal, in their universal applicability, the order of things
is to adopt an extreme view of the linguistic turn.
Personal identification may refer to historical, sociological, religious and biological
frameworks, but it has been argued here that personal identity must go beyond any
system of categorisation and reach to the personal significance that the child finds in
relation to these various frameworks and to existence itself.
As was indicated earlier, much of one’s sense of personal identity is established
through one’s values and the reasons for having such values. Therefore personal
identity should not be a matter of passively accepting a set of values as found in
frameworks. As MacIntyre (1984, p. 118) argues, we should not encourage children
to ask ‘what rules ought I to follow?’ but rather we should have them pursuing the
question ‘what sort of person am I to become?’ Personal identity, as Kierkegaard
explained, should be a task activity.
The formation of a choosing and responsible self is not something that pertains to
an atomistic understanding of the individual. Bruner (1990, p. 101) argues that the
self is only possible as ‘a transactional relationship between a speaker and an Other’.
Exercising personal freedom in the presence of others and assumed esssentialised
meanings may appear to be a daunting experience, so children need to become aware
that failing to take up the personal responsibility that comes with their freedom and
instead committing themselves to conforming with others, is in fact an exercise of
their freedom to choose.
Spiritual education should enable children to develop a positive sense of personal
identity. Rather than settling for superficial labels of identification, children should
be encouraged to pursue the who by responding to the question ‘who am I?’. This
is made possible by engaging with existential concerns in order to develop person-
ally significant purposes for their lives. Rather than focussing on the what – the
objects and entities in our environment – children should examine how they relate
to these. Such a project of spirituality is made possible by centring the child, but of
course not in the extreme fashion associated with Sartre where the individual is
considered to exist ‘outside’ of society. It is considered here that Stevens (1974,
p. 69) provides a clear balance of the necessity of the social environment in which
the individual is embedded, by claiming: ‘Thus, the self does not appear as a sepa-
rated spiritual entity but as a privileged center [sic] of reference within the field of
giveness’.
The formation of authentic personal identity requires one to choose oneself – one’s
identity, strong evaluation and possibilities. Spiritual education should encourage that
one clarify to oneself what one’s ‘strong evaluation’ is and the justifications for how
one relates, evaluates, believes, feels, acts and exists. Children do not need to be given
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freedom but should, through education, become aware of the freedom that they already
have. Authentic formation of personal identity requires the child to recognise, consider,
choose and then commit him or herself to living personally owned possibilities.
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